Tunisia: A New Dilemma

Suzane Mneimneh - Aug 02, 13

Geopoliticalmonitor.com 

 

 

The assassination of Mohammed al-Brahmy during Republic Day celebrations on July 25th, 2013 triggered a tidal wave of protests and demonstrations across Tunisia as people took to the streets to reject this violent act, which came a mere six months after the assassination of Shokri Belaid, the secretary-general of the opposition Unified Nationalist Democrats Party. Out on the streets, Tunisians expressed their rage towards the first and second temporary governments’ inability to arrest the perpetrators of these crimes, even after uncovering their identities and links to various militant religious groups.

In the wake of al-Brahmy’s assassination, Tunisia is now facing a dangerous turning point in its transition period, one that will inevitably impact the future politics of the country. Almost all opposition parties, democratic associations, and civil society organizations have come together to demand the government and the National Constituent Assembly dissolve, even after more than 45 deputies of the Council withdrew their support in a move to paralyze the work of the Council and induce an early dissolution.

Protestors are accusing the government and the al-Nahda (renaissance) Party (the most organized party in the country and the main component of the interim government, which also has a majority in the National Constituent Assembly) of being behind the assassinations. As a result, Al-Nahda has suffered repeated attacks on its local and provincial offices throughout the demonstrations.

 

In The Shadow of Egypt

The fallout from the Mohamed Morsi toppling has spread to Tunisia, and it seems clear that al-Nahda is trying to prevent a repeat of what happened to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

Yet these attempts might be frustrated by the fact that the Brotherhood in Tunisia followed much of the same steps as their counterparts in Egypt. For one, al-Nahda has been unable to solve Tunisia’s economic crisis. The trade deficit has reached record levels, inflation has spiked, and the unemployment rate remains very high. In the political sphere, al-Nahda has failed to initiate a national dialogue promoting reconciliation; it has attempted to control vital national public offices; and it has carried on its own separate agenda under the banner of religion. In doing so, they have ignored many of the country’s most pressing issues.

This latest assassination of a member of the opposition is expected to increase the pressure on the Tunisian Brotherhood, which is now facing attempts by its opponents to transplant the situation that toppled the Egyptian Brotherhood into Tunisia. If the current government falls, it officially marks the failure of a transitional period that has so-far produced a constituent assembly (that was supposed to draft a constitution) and an Islamist-led government.

Thus, the biggest challenge for the Brotherhood now and in the future is how not to lose power in Tunisia after the removal of their counterparts in Egypt. To survive in the face of plummeting popular support, al-Nahda is depending on support from the Global Muslim Brotherhood organization and the government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey. The failure of the movement to preserve its rule and the fall of the Brotherhood government through the legitimacy of votes would represent a final defeat of the group and the failure of the Global Brotherhood organization. In addition, it would end Erdogan’s ambitions of turning his country into a “command and control center” for the region's Muslim Brotherhood project.

 

The West and Tunisia
The dramatic transformations taking place in Egypt and Tunisia suggest a reversal in the initial outcomes of the Arab Spring. Though the U.S. initially supported Brotherhood rule in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, subsequent events, mainly the war in Syria and the attack on US diplomats in Libya, have no doubt called the wisdom of this initial position into question. One way to subtly shift positions would be for regional and international players to take advantage of internal forces that already exist within Tunisia and push for an overthrow of the al-Nahda movement. This could be achieved by focusing on “fatal” errors that the Brotherhood has already made in political and economic matters, as well as their dubious commitment to the consensus that is required for a country in transition.

 

Suzane Mneimneh is a contributor to Geopoliticalmonitor.com

The mechanism of US Military Interventionism

To predict the next US military adventure that would be on the same scale as Iraq 2003 and Afghanistan, I start by drawing a sketch of the mechanism of US interventionist mentality. This mentality is divided into four sections: A military doctrine, a prominent threat, a political/ideological vehicle, and justifications (acceptable both local and international).   

•          The US ‘military doctrine’ calls for "full dominance" over all possible US adversaries in every type of warfare now and in the future. This includes the control of physical earth and outer space, where many lethal weapons have recently been deployed as well as virtual or cyber space, which is the battleground of the future. The US has proven to be the only nation in history that was (and still is) capable of exerting such power over the rest of the globe or obtained such vast economic advantage. This power projection that built the American Empire is based on sheer military power. Thus, it became essential to prevent the rise of any power that challenges the American empire, or as we call it in the post WWII era; the socioeconomic structure of the US global order. In the post-Cold War era, the United States has become the world's only superpower, and it has every intention to keep it that way. According to the "Defense Planning Guidance" (DPG) that was drafted under the supervision of Paul Wolfowitz during the Bush Sr. administration in 1992, the United States strategy is focused on maintaining its military hegemony in the world. This is done either by preventing any state from developing military capabilities equal to or greater than the US, or by pre-emptive strikes against states that develop new military capabilities that might effectively challenge the United States supremacy.

•            During the Cold War era, the Soviet nuclear apocalypse threat served as an appropriate reason to justify US military interventionism in the world. The US used this threat to maintain access to strategic resources (oil, gas), markets, and cheap labor, as well as to ensure regimes’ loyalty to the US, and to overthrow hostile regimes and movements. The rising so-called Jihadist Attacks served the same purpose starting 9/11, 2001, which brings us to wonder about the nature of the future threat that will justify the US military interventionism?

•         During the Cold War, anti-communism served as the ideological vehicle to justify the US intervention in many regions to circumvent any attempt to change the dominant socioeconomic structure of the US led world order. In the post-Cold War era, anti-drugs and the ‘war on terror’ serve as the latest vehicle for the continued US intervention in the world. There has thus been a major continuity in the policy of finding vehicles for the US interventionist mentality to carry on its military adventures. Which makes us wonder, what the next vehicle might be?

•            In the recent history, the 9/11 attacks on the US soil justified its military intervention in Afghanistan. Americans as well as the international community were emotionally and morally mobilized by the 9/11 catastrophic attacks, no one dared to stand against the US especially after president Bush declared: “either you are with us, or against us”, and if you are against the US, then you are with the terrorists. Although the US did not have the same supportive national and international community in its war on Iraq 2003, it could not have carried out this campaign without claims of Saddam’s possession of WMD. We ask again, what might be the next intervention’s justification?

With that being said, even today with the decline in the US economic supremacy, the United Sates still views itself as the sole military power in the world. The US still has less restraint in using military intervention to force other nations to concede.    In today’s world, China is the rising power (both economically and militarily) challenging US supremacy. The Obama’s pivot east shows the US intention to start targeting China as a military threat in order to carry out its military expansion in Asia. The United States made it very clear long before 2007 that it would not tolerate any challenge to its domination over Asia. However, with the rapid expansion of China’s military capabilities, the next prominent threat to the US might be losing its domination not only in Asia but also in the world. It cannot be denied that the US is building military alliances around China (India, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, &South Korea) along with deploying more US troops in Asia-Pacific to be ready for any necessary measures.
 

During the US-Sino competition era, the vehicle to justify US military intervention in Asia would be socioeconomic reforms and security (maybe we'll call it socioeconomic Spring) to circumvent the Chinese attempt to change the dominant socioeconomic structure of the US led world order. The US will focus on surpassing the Chinese in control over natural resources, markets, labor, and loyal regimes. These factors facilitate US military intervention in any volatile region in Asia such as Taiwan, Chinese sea, Indian Ocean and even in Central Asia.

 Potential War with China

 People’s Liberation Army cyber-attacking the US Critical infrastructure causing catastrophic economic consequences that will mobilize the American nation to support such military operation. Chinese attack on this sector has the potential of bringing down multiple systems including air traffic control, emergency services, banking, trains, electrical power, oil and gas refineries, defense and security systems and dam control. The most precious aspect for the Americans (as for all other nations) after their lives is their livelihoods. And if 9/11 attacks mobilized them against terrorists due to the horrible way lives were lost, then Sino cyber-attack will mobilize them against China due to the socioeconomic anguish they will bare nationwide and not just in specific areas. With the developments in the drone technology, it will not be hard to convince Americans and the congress that such war will not coast much financially and humanly. The location of the of Chinese cyber-attacks on US critical infrastructure and government agencies which is a People’s Liberation Army base in China, (maybe in Shanghai as happened before), will be targeted by the US drones. China, of course, will refuse this act of aggression and will respond in the same manner. The escalation, depth, and extent of war operations depend on each party intentions, interests, and resolution in addition to the international community and each party's allies. 
 

 

Yemen: The Forgotten Front

Suzane Mneimneh - Jul 29, 13

Geopoliticalmonitor.com 

 

 

 

The struggle against al-Qaeda in Yemen stands as an unheralded though critical front in the global war against terrorism. This fight has taken the form of violent hit-and-run operations against the Yemen Army, itself backed by U.S. drones, and the establishment of territorial bases that are often in flux. Most recently the battle has shifted to Hadramaut province, which was already largely controlled by al-Qaeda, after the Yemen Army managed to regain control of Abyan province and expel Ansar al-Sharia. Despite these ostensible gains, al-Qaeda forces have proven adept at moving in to fill gaps in central authority and capitalizing on endemic instability, poverty, unemployment, and political division in Yemen- the very factors that provide the most fertile ground for spreading the group’s extremist beliefs.
Since its establishment in January 2009, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has launched numerous attacks against American interests in the region. In response, Washington has slowly expanded its drone attacks in Yemen and strengthened the government's ability to fight this 'organization' on its own via increased training and military assistance. With the onset of the Arab Spring in 2011, a political crisis emerged in Yemen between former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who ruled for more than 30 years, and his opponents who criticized the government’s systemic corruption and failure to provide basic services. Al-Qaeda took advantage of the growing security vacuum and launched a series of raids across the South in that year. As the Arab Spring intensified in Yemen, causing the overthrow of the Saleh regime, al-Qaeda significantly expanded it operations, particularly against the Yemeni armed forces. In March of 2012, an Islamic Emirate was declared in Shabwa province, and the city of Zanzibar has been held by the organization since 2012.

The surge of al-Qaeda’s activities in Yemen after the Arab Spring is a cause of great concern for both the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the United States. Yemen’s control over one of the most important naval straits in the world, the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb, which is located between Yemen and the Horn of Africa, underscores this geostrategic importance. Commercial liners and oil tankers pass through the strait on their way to and from the Suez Canal. International stakeholders are concerned that al-Qaeda will take advantage of the current transitional conditions in Yemen to threaten shipping and international trade, contributing to the maritime piracy that is already blighting the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.

There are several factors that will complicate new Yemeni President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi’s attempts to stabilize the South and reestablish central government authority. They include:

Terrain: al-Qaeda has concentrated its activities in areas that are mountainous and lacking in infrastructure, where literacy rates are low and poverty is rife. In this, Yemen poses challenges similar to those of Afghanistan.

Political Instability: The Islamists are taking advantage of post-revolution political turmoil. Currently, the armed forces are preoccupied with internal stability and domestic political power struggles; the Yemen Army is seeking to maximize its influence and presence in several cities, especially in the southern provinces. In fact, there are political parties and power blocs that are invested in al-Qaeda’s activities because they lost out in the process of political transition in Yemen. Many opposition groups and tribes have thus facilitated al-Qaeda’s activities as a way to weaken the incipient central government. For example, some tribes have allowed terrorists to establish safe havens for training and recruitment.

Arms: In addition to the fact that Yemen has the second highest rate of gun ownership in the world, al-Qaeda-allied groups have been able to seize large quantities of weapons, equipment, and ammunition from Yemeni army sites captured in the south and southeast of Yemen.

These factors have enhanced al-Qaeda’s ability to become President Hadi’s biggest challenge in moving the country from dictatorship to democracy. After the Arab Spring, the new leadership inherited a fragmented security and military apparatus that must contend with an organized terrorist structure with a strong grip on many of the important cities and regions in the southern part of the country. Given the circumstances, the new government is faced with a very difficult task. On the one hand, it must fulfill the political responsibilities entrusted to it in the transitional phase, particularly the responsibility to push for a national dialogue and political settlement. On the other hand, Hadi’s government has to eliminate all sources (economic, political, and security) that al-Qaeda is drawing on to strengthen its grip on the southern areas. It also needs to understand that the continued escalation of al-Qaeda activity will doubtlessly overshadow the overall situation in Yemen, making any political settlement vulnerable to further shocks. The war against Islamist militants is draining the state's resources, all at the expense of other political and economic development goals. In addition, security agencies have often botched operations in dealing with militants, thus prolonging the duration of the fight and encouraging al-Qaeda to carry out more daring attacks against top Yemeni leaders.

The inability of the new government to resolve the battle with al-Qaeda will affect the democratic transition negatively. It’s only a matter of time until Yemeni citizens lose confidence in the transitional government which has promised to fight terrorism and ease their economic hardship. This may push some people to engage in other local or regional political projects, or even fall into the arms of terrorist groups. Moreover, the continuation of these groups’ activities in Yemen will encourage dissatisfied young people on the regional and international level to come to Yemen and support the terrorist cause.

In the end, the geostrategic blessing of Yemen’s location - its proximity to oil wells of the Gulf and supervision of the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb - is turning into a geostrategic curse. At present, these characteristics merely expose the country to more external pressure and interference, turning it into an open battleground against terrorism. 

 

 

 

Suzane Mneimneh is a contributor to Geopoliticalmonitor.com 

Moving Towards the “Unmanned War”

 

On Tuesday May 14th, the US military succeeded in launching a drone from an aircraft carrier off the coast of Virginia, marking a historical first. The aircraft, an "X-47B" produced by Northrop Grumman, is considered to be the first unmanned aircraft that is able to be launched from a ship. The prototype had a successful flight of around 65 minutes, and ultimately landed at a base in Maryland. This event represents another step towards the mass production of drones, which will considerably boost US military capabilities.
The X-47B represents a sophisticated technological innovation in unmanned aircraft systems. It is part of a series of projects aimed at building a fleet of unmanned fighter aircraft. The most important advantage of the X-47B drone from its counterparts in the US Air Force (USAF) is that it can be controlled without any human input, as it is equipped with a control unit that can intervene during times of crisis, correct the drone’s path, and adjust its direction automatically. The drone can also specify targets using sophisticated techniques (like automated pilot), and it is equipped with sensors and GPS technology to avoid collisions. In addition, the drone is acknowledged for its accuracy in taking-off and landing in difficult places and narrow corridors.

The X-47B is also equipped with a jet motor that allows it to fly faster than the Predator drones currently used favored by the United States.

The development and production of unmanned aircrafts is surging to the extent that it is now the fastest-growing sector in the aerospace industry. More than 50 countries benefit from drones, and China and Germany are known to be developing their own models. These countries believe that unmanned aircraft give them a technological edge over competitors and can help avoid the civilian casualties that risk public opposition or protest.
Currently, drones are the US preferred method for combating terrorism due to many reasons, including: their ability to target and kill enemies without endangering US soldiers, and their accuracy in hitting targets vis-à-vis other weapons platforms.
This technology has also been applied on the domestic front in the US, such as monitoring the Mexican and Canadian borders. The Department of Homeland Security announced in its new strategy its aim to maintain security by increasingly relying on drones to collect intelligence information that will help security crews combat drug trafficking networks. There are about nine Predators scouring the American skies. Four of them are based in the city of Sierra Vista, Arizona, three are monitoring the border with Canada, and two are based at the Corpus Christi Marine base on the shores of the Gulf of Mexico.

Drones are most efficient when deployed in one of the following three scenarios: when authorized by mutually-agreed security agreements, such as in Yemen and Mali; in failing states that are losing control their own security; or with fully-failed states such as (at times) Somalia, Libya and others.

Nonetheless, it is difficult to speculate on how drones in war-from-far will proceed independent of human combatants in the long run. Their use in Iraq and Afghanistan has steadily stripped away humanity’s role in the war. These developments are not confined to the United States. The world market for unmanned military technologies is growing rapidly. Many militarily advanced countries such as Israel, Russia, United Kingdom, Iran, South Korea, and China have an increasing appetite for such technologies. Turkey is reportedly using drones to strike Kurdish rebel hideouts, while Israel hopes to use unmanned technologies to eventually patrol its Gaza border.

Before drones can become the future war-from-far primary weapon, the military has to prove they have strong control over launching attacks, clear perspective and data collection of potential targets, and the capability to operate in the harsh conditions within the limits of international law and ethics.

Suzane Mneimneh - Jun 05, 13

Geopoliticalmonitor.com

Suzane Mneimneh is a contributor to Geopoliticalmonitor.com

Iranian Navy Aims to Sail Off United States Shores

Suzane Mneimneh  |  September 8, 2012

 

Wikistrat, Atlantic Sentinel

 

(AP/Fars News Agency/Hamed Jafarnejad)

The head of the Iranian navy, Admiral Habibollah Sayyari, has stated that Iran aims to put warships in international waters off the United States coast “in the next few years.”
The comments were part of a response to Washington’s pronounced naval presence in the Persian Gulf and American plans for maritime war games later this month. Though Iran has made similar claims in the past, current tension over Tehran’s nuclear ambitions gives the proposed move a newfound credibility. At present, the United States naval presence in the region falls under the jurisdiction of the Fifth Fleet based in Bahrain.

Analysis

Reports of Iran’s deployment of warships across the Atlantic Ocean near the United States coast raise new concerns about the growing display of Iranian naval forces. The arrival of Iranian warships in the Atlantic Ocean represents clear evidence that Tehran’s strategic ambitions are widening.
The purpose of expanding the Iranian navy’s scope is primarily to intimidate the United States and the West and lead them to elevate or ease the pressure on Tehran on the nuclear issue. But increasing, naval activity such as has been proposed embodies a number of objectives that go beyond the subject of simple deterrence.
Iranians aim to restrain the United States at the stage of primary air attack that the American fleet in the Persian Gulf might launch in case of war. Such an attack would probably concentrate on Iranian air force bases and nuclear sites. Therefore, Iran wants to ensure the security of its strategic areas as well as its control over the Strait of Hormuz.
In addition, the presence of the Iranian navy in Atlantic waters, currently dominated by the American fleet, constitute a significant propaganda claim for Tehran that will exaggerate the capabilities of the Iranian armed forces and give its enemies the impression that Iran possesses an overwhelming force.
Also, because Tehran continues to experience an internal power struggle that is weakening the government, such activities may provide the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei with an opportunity to promote the image of unity and strength, mostly for local consumption.
Iran sees itself as a regional power and its navy is planning to further strengthen this perception. From this perspective, the Iranian navy will continue to exercise a notable presence in the Persian Gulf while at the same time remaining wary of the American presence and employing caution in this regard.

Wikistrat Bottom Lines

Opportunities

Iranian naval force is not concentrating only on military aspects but also attempts to boost the country’s economy through its presence in international waters and provide security to international transportation and maritime navigation.
Iranian naval forces in the promixity of American shores would give Venezuela another opportunity to demonstrate its independence from the United States and its connections to Iran by offering its harbors to Iranian ships.
Iran’s navy has been successful in operations to free ships hijacked by sea pirates.

Risks

The lack of communication between the Iranian and American naval forces carries the possibility of accidents and incidents that could trigger a large military confrontation.
Iranian overstretch could lead to heightened tensions and exacerbate splits between factions within Iran.
Other countries intimidated by the Iranian activities may expand their naval forces leading to a naval arms race across several regions, specifically the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea and the Mediterranean.

Dependencies

Iran may restrict its actions and limit its initiatives to propaganda.
Sanctions on Iran will limits its ability to improve its naval capabilities.

Richard Fiesel, Nick Nielsen and Zoya Sameen contributed to this analysis.

 

Ahmadinejad’s Departure Favors Khamenei Loyalists

Suzane Mneimneh  |  May 10, 2013

                           Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad inspects an honors guard after arriving in Accra, Ghana, April 17 (Presidency of Iran)


Next month, Iran may enter its most heated political phase since the 1979 revolution when the country is due to elect a new president.
Incumbent president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is legally barred from pursuing a third term. His successor will have to cope with many economic and foreign policy challenges created or at least aggravated during his eight years in power.
Adding to the gravity of the situation is a conflict between Ahmadinejad and the supreme leader, the continued inflexibility of Iran’s foreign politics and a deterioration in relations between the fathers of the revolution, former presidents Mohammad Khatami and Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani on the one hand and incumbent supreme leader Ali Hosseini Khamenei and Ahmad Jannati Massah, chairman of the Guardian Council, on the other.
The Guardian Council functions as a legislative senate and constitutional court at once and must also approve candidates before they can stand for political office. Members, appointed by the supreme leader and parliament, are usually clerics and lawyers. The president, by contrast, is elected through a popular vote.
June’s presidential election will be the first held after the hotly contested vote of 2009 when the reformist opposition split, Ahmadinejad was reelected and the main opposition candidate, former prime minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi, won just one in three votes according to the official results.
Ahmadinejad contained the subsequent unrest — hundreds of thousands of Mousavi’s supporters alleged fraud — at the expense of the reformists’ participation in political life with a campaign of arrests, exiles and house arrests.
The most prominent clash was among conservatives, however, who split into two factions: neoconservatives led by Ahmadinejad and fundamentalists led by the supreme leader. The conflict stemmed from a dispute about the distribution of power between their respective parts of the executive branch as well as Ahmadinejad’s policies.
Iran’s economy has all but collapsed under the weight of international sanctions, enacted to discourage it from developing a nuclear weapons capability, as well as its own mismanagement. Oil sales are down by half. Inflation might exceed 50 percent although estimates vary and the government put the rate at 31.5 percent in March. The official unemployment rate exceeds 12 percent.
Iranian politics has become more divisive. Whereas competition in the years following the 1979 revolution was largely limited to conservatives versus reformists, competing alignments within each faction have complicated the picture.
The struggle for the presidency will nevertheless be among the conservatives: between Ahmadinejad’s supporters and those of the supreme leader’s. The latter appear to have the advantage since last year’s parliamentary election when 68 percent of new legislators were Khamenei loyalists.
Khamenei seeks to avoid a repeat of the mass demonstrations that swept Iran after the 2009 election which were considered a threat to the survival of the regime. He also wants a loyalist elected who can unify the ruling powers and lead the country out of its present economic and political turmoil.
That is unlikely. Ahmadinejad’s supporters, even if they lose the upcoming vote, will not disappear. The internal upheaval, moreover, will make it all the more difficult for the next president to make any progress in international talks about the country’s nuclear program, thus prolonging its suffering as sanctions will remain in place.
Whether Iranian foreign policy as a whole will shift is more doubtful. Ahmadinejad’s legacy will be one of isolating the Shia republic while seeking to influence political events in countries ranging from Bahrain to Iraq to Syria, often against the backdrop of its struggle for regional hegemony with Sunni powers like Saudi Arabia.
Few, if any, of the foreign policy initiatives pursued during Ahmadinejad’s tenure bore fruit. His successor will have to rebalance Iran’s international relations.
If, as expected, that is a Khamenei loyalists, it might also reveal whether Iran’s foreign policy mishaps were truly Ahmadinejad’s or the supreme leader’s all along.

 

Lebanon Slipping into the Syrian Fire?

Suzane Mneimneh - Jun 26, 13

Geopoliticalmonitor.com

Clashes between the Lebanese army and followers of extremist cleric Ahmad al-Assir broke out in the southern city of Sidon this week, continuing for two straight days before entering into an apparent lull. According to Lebanese officials, 16 soldiers were killed and more than 100 wounded since the arrest of an al-Assir follower prompted an alleged militia attack on an army checkpoint. Ahmad al-Assir remains at large, with some speculating that he has fled to Syria.

The al-Assir phenomenon has caught the entire Lebanese political spectrum off guard. Political, legal and security institutions have thus far been hesitant in their response to the rising number of incidences that are occurring outside the context of traditional alignments represented by the March 8 and March 14 Alliances.

Ahmad al-Assir is the imam of the Bilal bin Rabbah mosque in Sidon. His fame spiked several months ago when he began speaking out against Hezbollah and the regimes in Syria and Iran. Besides the usual arguments about Hezbollah’s weapons – concerns that are echoed by the opposition- al-Assir went beyond conventional Lebanese political discourse by stressing the sectarian differences between Sunni and Shiite.

The two main forces driving the al-Assir phenomenon are the deterioration of traditional Sunni leadership and Hezbollah’s support of al-Assad in the Syrian conflict. Al-Assir simply rose to fill the void in the Sunni street after the post-Doha agreement political and financial deterioration of the Future movement in Sidon, and more recently, the removal of Saad Hariri as prime minister. To put it another way, the Future-stream leadership relinquished its control of Lebanon to the so-called ‘Islamic current’ that proved more dynamic in responding to the challenges of the moment.

Regionally, the fall of al-Qusayr inaugurated a new phase in the Syrian conflict. Hezbollah’s interference triggered not only an expansion of regional fighting, but also a wave of responses from Hezbollah’s critics, which in turn is intensifying sectarian divisions in Lebanon and beyond. The al-Assir phenomenon illustrates the extent of the tensions between Sunnis and Shiites in Lebanon, tensions which are now manifesting in their open support of the two sides of the Syrian conflict.
Yet both Sunnis and Shiites in Lebanon will point at the other side and claim that orders are coming from Damascus or Doha; the outside powers seeking to tip the sectarian scales in Lebanon. The Sunni camp claims that what is happening in Sidon was planned by the Syrian regime in an attempt to respond to Doha’s efforts to arm the Syrian opposition. These allegations raise further international concerns regarding al-Assad’s capacity to transfer the war out of Syria and into neighboring countries, particularly Lebanon, in order to increase the strategic costs of removing the ruling Syrian regime for both Arab and Western countries and force a re-think of the wisdom of arming the Syrian opposition.
The Shiite side is also being provided with propaganda fodder. Last Saturday in Doha, Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani declared at the “Friends of Syria” meeting that there will be a roadmap with a specific timetable for the political process in Syria. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry also confirmed that Washington would raise the level of military support for the Syrian opposition in order to achieve balance with the Assad regime, thus in theory forcing it to seek a political settlement. This conference took place after the Syrian regime (supported by Hezbollah and Russia) made significant advances on the battleground.

Shiites believe that by providing the opposition with sufficient weapons and training, Western countries and their Arab allies aim to remove Hezbollah from the Syrian equation. A further way to achieve this is distracting it with internal conflicts, and that’s where the Saudi and Qatari proxies in Lebanon come into play. Ahmed al-Assir and Salim al-Rafii’s jihadist calls have come in response to Hezbollah’s public involvement in Syria. Devising clashes and internal fighting between Hezbollah and other Lebanese groups will ultimately weaken Hezbollah and keep it out of Syria while the Syrian opposition makes its way to the center of Damascus.

In this sense, the Syrian crisis is having a substantial impact on Lebanon, and any attempt at damage mitigation is frustrated by the high degree of political polarization at the local level, as well as the entrenched links between Lebanese groups and outside powers.

A Fine Balance: US-Egyptian Relations after Morsi

Suzane Mneimneh - Jul 12, 13

Geopoliticalmonitor.com

News outlets, think tanks, and politicians worldwide are discussing the huge dilemma now faced by Washington on the shape and structure of US-Egyptian relations after the Egyptian Army toppled the democratically elected government of President Mohamed Morsi on July 3rd. U.S. President Barack Obama and his administration must decide between supporting democracy or supporting the popular opposition against the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt. This decision will have a major influence on future relations between the two countries, particularly on the issue of aid.
If President Obama chooses to abide by democratic principles, then he will characterize what happened in Egypt as a military coup. Consequently, Obama will be forced to comply with a U.S. law that bans "any assistance to the government of any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup d’état or decree." Given that most U.S. aid goes to the armed forces, weakening the army (the only stable and reliable institution in Egypt at present) might end up reinforcing the MB and other extremists in Egypt, in which case no one can eliminate the possibility of a civil war. However, if he stands by the millions of Egyptians who gathered in Tahir Square and demanded the departure of Morsi, then the removal of the president will be sanctioned and the MB political project in Egypt and the MENA will go underground.
U.S. efforts to spread democracy in the MENA however will be smeared with hypocrisy.
After meeting with top advisers in the White House, Obama expressed in a statement his "grave concern" about the situation in Egypt but never used the word "coup." And given July 11th reports that the U.S. is going ahead with the delivery of four F-16s to the Egyptian military, it is highly unlikely that the word will be appearing in official U.S. statements anytime soon.
To understand US-Egyptian relations, we need to realize that the U.S. has two distinctive channels through which Washington implements it policies: one with the Egyptian presidency, and the other with the Egyptian Army.
The army is mostly independent from other state institutions in Egypt, and as such it exerts a large influence on financial and administrative affairs in isolation from civilian leadership. According to the constitution, the defense minister is assigned from army officers. The Army budget is unsupervised by the parliament or the government, instead falling under the purview of the National Defense Council, which itself is dominated by the military. Moreover, the military budget is not limited to armaments; it stretches to incorporate factories and food companies, land holdings and many other areas, amounting to an estimated one-third of the Egyptian economy. In this sense, the Egyptian Army needs to continue receiving U.S. aid to float the national economy. The U.S., in turn, needs the Egyptian Army so as not to lose its influence in Egypt. After the Revolution, which manifested a potential threat to U.S. interests, Washington was keen to preserve the conditions that would ensure the continuation of the strategic alliance between the two countries and maintain U.S. influence in the region. The importance of Egypt to Washington, (given the substantial benefit the U.S. previously derived from the Mubarak regime and his army in return for the U.S. aid) is manifest in Egypt’s faithful adherence to its obligations toward Israel and in convincing other parties in the region to seek peace. In addition, the Egyptian Army facilitates applications for the U.S. military to cross the Suez Canal and utilize Egyptian airspace. Some U.S. military equipment is also stored in Egypt.
This mutually beneficial relationship compels the U.S. administration to support the Egyptian Army because it has been the only stable and reliable partner in Egypt in the past. On the other side, this tends to make the Egyptian military compliant when it comes to U.S. requests.
The U.S. is also important to Adli Mansour, Egypt’s interim president, because of what the U.S. can offer in terms of avoiding economic collapse. Even the most optimistic visions confirm that the Egyptian economy is going through an intensifying crisis. The new president – like Morsi before – will most likely plead for loans and financial aid from the international community, and the most important loans he will be eager to secure are those from the International Monetary Fund. An agreement with the IMF could open the door for aid amounting to $12 billion from other reluctant financiers, including the European Union, the United States and Gulf Arab states (especially Saudi Arabia and Qatar). The loan may also reassure investors and attract the foreign investment that Egypt is desperate to bring back. Because the IMF Fund is mainly subject to the control of the U.S, it is imperative that the new president get Washington's support in order to be thrown a financial lifeline.
In this sense, the U.S. has two tools to shape its relations with the new Egyptian regime: The economic crisis and the armed forces. The new Egyptian government will inevitably have to contend with the legacy of the Second Revolution: all Egyptian economic and societal problems were blamed on Morsi, the military and the opposition used these grievances to fuel public anger, and eventually ousted Morsi and his government. Therefore, the new president will approach the U.S. with caution knowing that he will always have the shadow of the Army on his path.
As for the United States, it will continue keeping a balance between its relations with the Egyptian president and the Egyptian army.  The balance will always shift to the side that ensures the continuity of Egypt's commitment to the following:  the Camp David Peace Treaty, the retention of a demilitarized Sinai, retaining multinational troops and observers led by the U.S., maintaining gas exports to Israel, isolating Hamas, resisting Iran's efforts to expand its influence, resisting al-Qaida, and keeping the Suez Canal open.

Suzane Mneimneh is a contributor to Geopoliticalmonitor.com

Understanding Egypt 2nd Revolution: Containing the Islamist Factor in the Arab Spring

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Introduction

Hundreds of thousands of Egyptians celebrated this week the fall of Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood regime. Egyptians flooded streets and squares in all provinces recalling a similar picture two and half years ago during the celebration of the fall of President Hosni Mubarak’s regime. General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the defense minister, has made ​​a statement on Wednesday July 3^rd, after compliance with the national forces to ensure isolation of President Mohamed Morsi from office, and conduct early presidential elections. The chancellor Adli Mansour, head of the Supreme constitutional Court, temporary claimed the President responsibilities to manage the country during the transitional phase and the suspension of the current constitution, in response to millions of Egyptians who took to the streets on June 30 to demand the departure of Mercy.

The international reactions and Arabic reactions after the Egyptian army ousted Mohammed Morsi varied extremely. While the western capitals and the United Nations expressed concerns about the rising situation, the Gulf States and some Arab countries hastened to welcome removing the Muslim Brotherhood from power and these countries are (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Jordan, Syria) in addition to the Israel.

The rise of the Muslim Brotherhood after the overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak in 2011, enraged most of the Gulf Arab states including the UAE, which feared the strengthening of the so-called Islamists at home. Qatar was the only Gulf Arab states, which celebrated the Egyptian revolution in 2011 that toppled Mubarak. The Arab News Press reported that Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah sent a congratulatory message to Chancellor Adli Mansour - Chief Justice of the Supreme Constitutional Court in Egypt- who is appointed as temporary head of state[1].

The United Arab Emirates also welcomed change in Egypt and commended the Egyptian Armed Forces. Reuters quoted "We followed with all consideration and satisfaction the national consensus that your brotherly country is witnessing, and which had played a prominent role in leading Egypt peacefully out of the crisis it had faced," UAE President Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed al-Nahayan said in a cable to Mansour[2]. Kuwait's ruler Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Sabah also congratulated Egypt's interim president. Reuters reported, “Sheikh Sabah praised Egypt's armed forces for the positive and historic role" it played in preserving stability”[3].

There was no comment yet from Qatar, the only Gulf Arab state that openly supported the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The only response is conveyed through al-Jazeera that stated that Qatar stands with the Egyptian people without mentioning which group of the Egyptian people (MB) or (non-MB)[4].

The Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who is fighting to crush the uprising for more than two years now, considered that the unrest in Egypt, "the defeat of political Islam."[5] Assad said in an interview with the state-run Al-Thawra newspaper, "What is happening in Egypt is the fall of so-called political Islam," Assad said. "This is the fate of anyone in the world who tries to use religion for political or factional interests."[6]

On the international stage, the European Union called for a quick return to democracy in Egypt. EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton, said in a statement: " I urge all sides to rapidly return to the democratic process, including the holding of free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections and the approval of a constitution,"[7]. Ashton said she hoped there would be a new representative administration in Egypt reflecting various spectra of political orientations in society. She also stressed the importance of ensuring full respect of fundamental rights and the rule of law. Ashton called on all parties to exercise restraint, saying, "I strongly condemn all acts of violence and offer condolences to the families of the victims and urge the security forces to do everything in its power to protect the lives and safety of Egyptian citizens."[8]

As for the U.S, President Barack Obama expressed deep concern of removing a democratically elected president by the Egyptian army, but did not condemn the move, which may lead to cut the bulk of U.S. aid to Egypt. Obama issued a written statement in response to the events in Egypt after meeting with his national security advisers in the White House. The meeting was held shortly after the intervention of the Egyptian army. Obama’s response did not reach the level of a direct explicit condemnation, in reference to the growing concern among U.S. officials over the leadership of Morsi and the MB[9].

The British position was more definite, as Prime Minister David Cameron said, “We never support in countries the intervention by the military, but what needs to happen now in Egypt is for democracy to flourish and for a genuine democratic transition to take place”. Cameron also stressed that "All parties need to be involved in that, and that's what Britain and our allies will be saying very clearly to the Egyptians."[10]

For his part, President Francois Hollande said, "The democratic process has stopped and must return. What is happening in Egypt is obviously a fail. It is not only people who gathered but also a president who was toppled after democratic election. So the challenge, now, is to do everything in order to start the process again”. As his British counterpart, Holland stressed that "What really matters is to organize irreproachable elections as soon as possible, as the army took the responsibility of toppling the president and asked the constitutional court president to fulfill this function."[11]

In a related context, the Secretary-General of the United Nations Ban Ki-moon considered the military intervention in Egypt to be "worrisome" while stressing that the demands of the Egyptians demonstrators are "legitimate".

The Secretary-General of the United Nations called all parties at this time of great tension and instability in the country to calm and resort to dialogue and non-violent means to solve this crisis.

Domestic Analysis

After the fall of Mubarak in 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood (which has been officially outlawed and worked in secret for over 80 years) emerged as the best and perhaps only organized political forces in Egypt next to the armed forces. The 2011 demands to start a democratic political traditional after spending 60 years under the army’s domination from Jamal Abdel Nasser to Hosni Mubarak, reflected peoples rejection of the army’s presence in Egypt’s political future. The Muslim Brotherhood managed to exploit this sentiment. Same as the Turkish AKP (the MB counterpart in Turkey) managed to win 2002 elections. However, the AKP was able to stay in power for almost 12 years without military intervention.

Due to its professionalism, military in Turkey was the institution that had the necessary organization and tools to take power. The Turkish Military became the guardian of the modern state system and the existing political regime. In 2002, Erdoğan took advantage of the general sense of popular fatigue with competing old-school politicians in a country still spinning in a circle of economic crisis. From the beginning, great successes marked the early years of AKP rule. Waves of non- religious reforms mostly targeting corruption in the government and its institutions, the opening of EU accession negotiations, the end of torture in jails, the strong economic expansion, the new ties with neighboring counties, and more improvements for ethnic Kurds made the AKP government more successful than any previous governments. Erdogan played down the Islamist notions and actions in his policies in order not to raise the anger of the Military and lead it to a coup to oust the AKP just as they did to Erbakan government in 1998. He learned his lessons from Erbakan’s explicit attempts to bring back Islam to the Turkish politics. Therefore, his strategy was to fill the Turks pockets, ensure their daily bread, and strengthen the economy. At the same time, Erdogan avoided any explicit so-called Islamization of the political (or military) system in Turkey, at least in first stages of his rule. Then, he started introducing changes little by little and one by one, so that it will not provoke the army. 

 

In this sense, Islamists in Turkey differed from those in Egypt in their political agenda and strategy. The MB was hasty in implementing their agenda. They wanted to control the political system leaving out all other groups and political orientations, establish a Brotherhood state that will set an example for other countries in the Middle East, and fight secularism, modernism, and the Western influence in Egypt while cooperating with it to stay in power. They tried to do in one year what Erdogan did in 12 years. Here lays the MB mistake.

The driving force behind the Arab revolutions in 2011 are mainly young dissatisfied middle class, but Islamic groups - like the Muslim Brotherhood - were in the best position to win the rewards of the transition process. The Muslim Brotherhood won in Egypt in several elections, including the presidential election and Morsi became the first democratically elected president in the country. Nevertheless, just as similar organizations in Tunisia, MB were not able to get rid of the secret habits they acquired through their past. Critics say they have sought to control all state institutions by occupying key positions and turning them into fortresses of the Muslim Brotherhood rather than serve the country. The Muslim Brotherhood incapability to solve the crisis stemmed from 2011 revolution has extended to the economy and produced an economic catastrophe due to mismanagement. Egyptians suffered from the scarcity of food especially poor families as well as higher prices of bread and fuel. As a result, Egypt suffered from worsening budget deficit, which rose to more than 200 billion pounds, a decrease in foreign exchange reserves of$ 36 billion to $ 13 billion, and a fall in the value of the Egyptian pound from $ 6 pounds to 8 pounds to the dollar. This situation is the motivation of the magnitude of the protest movement.

International Business Times

                                                                                     

The MB political and economic mismanagement led to popular rejection of the MB rule, and after the army intervened to isolate Morsi, the MB political project is falling apart. Now the future of the movement seems uncertain at best. It is a heavy blow to the Islamic movement as a whole. The insufficient performance of Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood undermines the image of the Islamists, their status and their rhetoric throughout the region. It also raises questions regarding their competence and their ability to manage things.

Geopolitical Analysis

To understand the geopolitical implication of the second Egyptian revolution the question to be asked is not why it happened, but why now?

Let us connect the dots of latest events on the Middle Eastern stage:

1-     June 8 2013, The Syrian Army supported by Hezbollah capture al-Qusayr area and turned the table to their favor

2-     June 22 2013, Friends of Syria conference in Doha: stressed arming Syrian rebellions to rebalance the battleground that was leaning towards al-Assad camp

3-     June 24 2013, Ahmad Al Assir Army killed Lebanese Soldiers in fierce Clashes: his intentions were to expand the clashes to include Hezbollah.

4-     June 25 2013,  Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani assumes power in Qatar

5-     June 30 2013, Thousands of people joined protests across Egypt calling for President Morsi to resign

6-     July 4 2013, The military oust Morsi

Therefore, if we connect these events together, we will come up with the following:

A bunch of so-called Islamists (whether moderates such as the MB, or extremists such as al-Qaeda and its affiliates) are running the opposition battleground in Syria. These groups are fiercely supported by Qatar (shiek Hamad) who refused to tune down his support. The US and its western allies (and Israel) fear the uncontrolled spread of such groups in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia is bothered with rising Qatari role and influence in the region. Moreover, all (US, Allies, Saudis) are concerned about the way things are turning in Syria. However, although approved arming the opposition, they do not want arms to fall in the hands of extremists or so-called Islamist groups.

Therefore, starting from Doha conference, they decided to eliminate the so-called Islamist factor from the Syrian crisis. To do that, they need to eliminate their financial support and their political support. In Lebanon, they tried to keep Hezbollah busy with internal clashes by moving Al-Assir (Saudi Arabia proxy in Lebanon) and his militia against the Lebanese army to drag Hezbollah in to a fight. However, that did not work as expected. Yet, there are still extremists in Tripoli who provoke Hezbollah almost every day.   

Coming back to the so-called Islamists in the Syrian opposition, handing power to prince Tamim bin Hamad is the start to change Qatar uncontrolled support to these groups in Syria. To keep his father’s achievements in enhancing Qatar’s economic and political position in the world, prince Tamim needs the US. Therefore, he will be more compliant than his father to the US demands.                                                                                                               

As for the second Egyptian revolution, it was meant to happen eventually… but why now.

Most Egyptians (the non-Brotherhood members) felt their 2011 revolution was ripped off by the MB. This group, due to its highly organization, was able to take advantage of the chaos after outing Mubarak regime and succeed in controlling the parliament, changing the constitution, and reaching presidency. Morsi’s practices and his attempts to what newspapers call Islamize the political system in Egypt, caused continuous protests in Liberty Square. Only this protest succeeded mainly due to the army’s support.

Again, why now?

Eliminating the leading MB group in Egypt will weaken all other MB in the Middle East; especially in Syria. Containing this group in the Syrian opposition will open the way for so-called non-Islamist groups to become stronger whether in the FSA or in the Syrian opposition council abroad. This way, it will be easier for the US and its allies to arm secular-nationalist groups who can take down the terrorists groups (weakened by eliminating the Qatari support) and lead the opposition political and armed operations. By balancing the battleground, al-Assad regime will not win. All what might happen is dividing Syria into many pieces; one led by al-Assad, one by the opposition, and other enclaves (maybe a Kurdish one).

There is a need to contain the so-called Islamist factor in the Arab Spring. It is true that the US supported the Brotherhood rule in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. But the events in Syria and attacking and killing US diplomats in Libya makes the US think again about allowing the so-called Islamists to rule the Middle East.

Bottom Lines



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Opportunities:

• This hit to the MB will make them recalculate their policies. Even if they participated in the coming elections and win, they will have to share power with the army and other political groups in the Egyptian society. Thus, a balance will be achieved to always correct the MB path if they reach power again. This will also be a lesson to all MB groups in power in the Middle East.

• The MB failed in its so-called Islamist project

• It is clear now that people do not believe that their version of rule “is the solution”.

Risks

• The MB proved their failure in ruling internally and internationally.  The future, however, is vague. There are fears of Egypt turning into Algeria in 1991after the army ousted the democratically elected so-called Islamist government. The MB retaliation might lead the country into a civil war or a blood bath.

• There are also fears that the army will take over power again and confiscate the people’s revolution.

• Any setback caused to the Muslim Brotherhood in their stronghold raises basic questions regarding their ability to rule in other countries from Tunisia to Syria. The reaction of MB in neighboring countries is still to be determined.

•   This event might set a precedent in the Egyptian political system; whenever the people object their government policies, they take it to the streets, and if the will of the army came together with the will of the people, then we have a coup.

 

Dependencies:

 

• The army fulfill his timetable; parliamentary and presidency elections take place, power is handed to a civilian leaders, and stability is restored to the country.

•  The MB realizes that defying the army and the people will lead to unwanted bloody clashes. The group resort to election ballots again and try this time to learn from their previous mistakes.

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[1] Arab News, “King Abdullah congratulates new Egyptian leader”, Friday July 5, 2013 < http://www.arabnews.com/news/456958>

[2] Reuters, “UAE, Kuwait congratulate Egypt's Mansour after Mursi's overthrow”, Thursday July 4, 2013 < http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/04/us-egypt-protests-emirates-idUSBRE9630AX20130704>

[3] Reuters, “UAE, Kuwait congratulate Egypt's Mansour after Mursi's overthrow”, Thursday July 4, 2013 < http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/04/us-egypt-protests-emirates-idUSBRE9630AX20130704>

[4] Al-Jazeera English, “International reactions to Morsi's removal”, July 4, 2013 <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/07/201373223029610370.html>

[5] HUFFPOST world Canada, “Assad: Egypt's Ousting Of Morsi Means 'The Fall Of Political Islam'”, July 3, 2013 <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/03/assad-morsi-political-islam_n_3542737.html>

[6] HUFFPOST world Canada, “Assad: Egypt's Ousting Of Morsi Means 'The Fall Of Political Islam'”, July 3, 2013 <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/03/assad-morsi-political-islam_n_3542737.html>

[7] EUbusiness, “EU calls for swift Egypt elections after Morsi ousted” July 04, 2013 < http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/egypt-politics.por>

[8] EUbusiness, “EU calls for swift Egypt elections after Morsi ousted” July 04, 2013 < http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/egypt-politics.por>

[9] BBC News, “World reaction to the ousting of Egypt's Mohammed Morsi” July 4, 2013 < http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23175379>

[10] BBC News, “World reaction to the ousting of Egypt's Mohammed Morsi” July 4, 2013 < http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23175379>

[11] BBC News, “World reaction to the ousting of Egypt's Mohammed Morsi” July 4, 2013 < http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23175379>